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Jephthah the Gileadite, whose story is told in chapter eleven of the 
Book of Judges, is primarily known for his infamous vow (see now 
Marcus, 1986). Yet, Jephthah was also a successful general, an effective 
negotiator, and an astute diplomat. Notwithstanding these accomplish-
ments, Jephthah early in his career was the victim of fraternal rivalry, 
and had to suffer the indignity of being driven out of his ancestral home 
by his younger half-brothers. 1 It is this episode which is the focus of this 
article. We will try to answer the question of how these younger brothers 
of Jephthah were able to dispossess him so readily. 
The solution is no doubt to be found in Jephthah's background. 
However, Jephthah was not disinherited simply because he was the son 
of a prostitute ( YfSiih zonah, verse 1 ), or as the brothers euphemistically 
termed her 'another woman' C'issiih "al;ieret, verse 2), because in ancient 
Israelite law the inheritability of children depended not on the mother, 
but on the father. We believe that the answer lies in the fact that 
Jephthah had originally been adopted by his father Gilead. When Gilead 
died, Jephthah's half-brothers challenged his adoption in court, and they 
succeeded in having his adoption revoked and annulled. 
We start with the premise that, whatever the real reason for Jephthah's 
disinheriting, it must have had a legal basis, and there must have been 
court proceedings in which the elders participated. This is indicated by 
the following considerations: 
First, Jephthah is throughout the story portrayed as a military 
strongman. He is described as a gibbor l;wyil 'an able warrior',2 gains 
I. Parallels in other ancient Near Eastern literatures to the epic motif of a hero being 
driven out by his brothers and prevailing in the end, have been shown by Tadmor, 1966, 
p. 345, and Greenstein & Marcus, 1976, pp. 76-77. 
2. The fact that this epithet is applied to Jephthah at the beginning of the story is quite 
significant. It represents a characteristic which Jephthah possessed from the very start, and 
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fame through his military exploits, and he is the man the elders want to 
take over as commander during the Ammonite emergency. The brothers 
then could not have driven him out by force. They must have done so 
through a legal process. 
Second, that this process involved the elders is explicitly stated by 
Jephthah when he accuses them of being responsible for his banishment: 
"Jephthah replied to the elders of Gilead, 'You are the very people who 
rejected me and drove me out of my father's house"' (verse 7). As a legal 
procedure, disinheriting would have to take place before a court, and the 
court would be constituted by elders. 3 The brothers initiated the dis-
inheriting proceedings, but it was the elders in their role as a juridical 
court who pronounced the verdict and ruled against Jephthah. There is 
hence no conflation of traditions here, as believed by some scholars (e.g., 
Burney, 1918, pp. 303-4; Richter, 1966, p. 494) who point to verse 2 
which states that the brothers drove Jephthah out, and verse 7 which 
implies that Jephthah was banished by the elders. 
Thirdly, when the brothers make their complaint against Jephthah, 
the Peshitta version twice uses the third person instead of the second 
person of the Masoretic text. Instead of the Hebrew "you shall not 
inherit," and "you are the son of another woman" (verse 2) the Syriac 
translation has: "he shall not inherit" and "he is the son of another 
woman." This use of the third person singular indicates that, at least one 
ancient tradition viewed the brothers as addressing a third party, and is 
additional evidence that the brothers brought their claim before a court. 
If there was a court hearing, what happened in court? Since there is 
no evidence to assume that the elders were corrupt, or arbitrarily ruled 
against Jephthah, we are entitled to ask what was the legal justification 
for the brothers' suit and the elders' subsequent ruling to disinherit 
Jephthah? 
not one which will only be earned later. In this respect Jephthah's epithet is akin to the 
epithets applied to other biblical characters such as Ehud and Eglon who are termed 
respectively "a left-handed man" and "a very stout man" (Judges 3:15, 17). Or Abigail who 
is called "intelligent and beautiful," whereas her husband is described as "a hard man" 
(I Sam 25:3). All these epithets are not only meaningful for their respective stories, but 
were obviously not acquired later. So if Jephthah is termed "an able warrior" in the first 
verse, that is the characteristic which the author wishes to convey to us that Jephthah has 
throughout the story including the period of time before his expulsion. 
3. This was as true for ancient Israel as it was for the rest of the ancient Near East. We 
note an Old Babylonian letter (Lutz, 1917, p. 13 Marcus, 1981, p. 37) where the writer 
says he assembled twenty elders of the city in order to disinherit a young man who had run 
away. 
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As mentioned above, it could not have been because he was the son of 
a 'prostitute' or of 'another woman' despite the text ostensibly using this 
as the justification: "They said to him, 'You shall have no share in our 
father's estate, for you are the son of another woman"' (verse 2), 
because in ancient Israelite law the inheritability of children depended 
not on the mother, but on the father. For example, children from a 
woman other than the first or favored wife, and children from a concu-
bine, were entitled to a share in the inheritance. 4 
This fact is illustrated in numerous cases in the Bible, both in narrative 
and in legal passages. Some narrative examples: Ishmael, the son of the 
slave-girl, Hagar, was legally entitled to a share of Abraham's inheri-
tance, and would no doubt have received it had Sarah not cast him out 
(Gen 21:10). Other children of Abraham's concubines also received 
inheritance gifts (Gen 25:6). The sons of Jacob's concubines, Bilhah and 
Zilpah, rank equally with those of his wives as ancestors of tribes (Gen 
35:23-26). An example from the legal corpus is in Deut 21:15-17 where 
a first born son of a non-favorite wife is held to be entitled to his proper 
privileged inheritance. 
Since in all these cases the children of all these different classes of 
women inherit in one form or another, Jephthah's brothers cannot have 
meant "son of another woman" literally. Otherwise the disinheriting 
would have been clearly illegal (this is in fact the opinion of some 
medieval Jewish commentators, e.g., Kimhi (1160-1235], and Abravanel 
[ 1437-1508]), and the elders should not have ruled in their favor. 
But what about son of a prostitute? Since we know that prostitutes 
could marry (Lev 21:7, 14), there does not seem to be any reason why a 
son of a prostitute could not inherit just like a son of any other class of 
woman. In Mesopotamian law the possibility that such a son could 
inherit was taken into consideration by the Sumerian laws of Lipit 
Ishtar (section 27, see Pritchard, 1967, p. 160), which legislates that 
when a childless married man has children by a prostitute those children 
will be his heirs. 
Now Jephthah's case is slightly different than the case described in the 
Lipit Ishtar law. In his case Gilead's wife subsequently bore him children. 
4. For a contrary view see Eichler, 1985, p. 422. Note that in Mesopotamian law the 
right of the sons of a concubine to inherit was not guaranteed by law, but depended solely 
upon the wishes of the father. Thus in the Code of Hammurabi (see Pritchard, 1969, 
p. 173), sections 170 & 171 deal with the case of a father recognizing as his sons the 
children born to him by a slave girl. Were he to acknowledge them, they would be 
considered among his heirs. But if be fails to acknowledge them, they have no claim to his 
estate. 
108 DAVID MARCUS 
The Lipit Ishtar law does not consider the eventuality of the former 
barren wife bearing children, and the subsequent status of the prostitute's 
child. 
According to Mendelsohn (1954, p. 119), such a case was handled 
according to local custom, and as applied to Jephthah's case, local 
Gileadite custom must have been to support the sons of the natural 
wives and disinherit all others. But this is only conjecture, and the 
biblical examples cited above concerning slave-girls and concubines 
would make the existence of even such a local custom quite dubious. 
We are left with the conclusion that the legal grounds for the brothers 
disinheriting Jephthah do not rest on the status of his mother, being 
'another woman' or 'a prostitute'. If not, then on what do they rest? We 
believe that they rest on the fact that Jephthah had originally been 
adopted by their father Gilead. When Gilead died, the brothers chal-
lenged the adoption presumably on the grounds that a prostitute's son 
could not be adopted, and they succeeded in having his adoption re-
voked and annulled in court. 
That Jephthah had been adopted can be demonstrated by the legal 
terminology which Jephthah employs in his dialogue with the elders 
when they come to him, in their capacity of representatives of Gileadites, 
to enlist his aid against the Ammonites. Jephthah at first refuses their 
request. The refusal is couched in a rhetorical question format which not 
only underlines Jephthah's rejection of their offer but indicates his 
incredulity that, considering what the elders, in their capacity as a legal 
court, did to him, they would have come to him for aid (see Marcus, 
1989). Jephthah complains to the elders that he has been unjustly 
disinherited because his legal status in the household had been ques-
tioned and rejected, and he will not return with them until this status is 
restored. 
Jephthah uses terms which legally indicate revocation and annulment 
of adoption agreements; and when he imposes the conditions for his 
return he uses a term which legally indicates restoration to a status ante 
in these same adoption agreements. 
The terms which indicate revocation and annulment are the verb 
siine', lit. 'to hate' and the verb gerres, lit. 'to drive out'. Jephthah says to 
the elders: "did you not hate me (siine~), and drive me out (gerres) from 
my father's house?" (verse 7). Both these verbs have special connotations 
in legal proceedings and can be elucidated by ancient Near Eastern 
adoption contracts. These contracts nearly always have revocation 
clauses indicating the eventualities should one party not keep his or her 
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part of the contract. It is no mere coincidence, then, that the precise 
Akkadian semantic cognates of the Hebrew words of our text (Siine:o and 
gerreS), actually occur in these revocation clauses. 
The Akkadian cognate of Hebrew Siine:o is zeru, and it also literally 
means 'to hate'. However, in the revocation clauses of adoption con-
tracts it means 'to reject' (Marcus, 1981, p. 40). Some examples follow. 
I. From the Ana lttishu practice texts (III, iv:40-43 = Landsberger, 
1937, pp. 49-50), dating from the Old Babylonian period: "If (an adopted 
son) rejects (izzer) his father, he shall forfeit whatever he has brought 
with him." 
2. From the Code of Hammurabi, #193 (see Pritchard, 1969, p. 175): 
"If an adopted son of a girsequm-functionary or of a sekretum-priestess, 
discovered his natural parents, then, after rejecting (izer) his foster 
father and his foster mother, he has run off to his natural parents' home, 
his eye shall be plucked out. 
3. From an adoption contract from Ugarit circa 14th century B.C.E. 
(Nougayrol, 1955, p. 55, lines 7-14) [names omitted]: "If the adopter 
wants to reject (izer) the adoptee as his son he must pay him 100 silver 
shekels. But if the adopted son wants to reject (izer) his adopted father, 
he will wash his hands (qiite§u imassi), and go off into the street (ina 
suqi ipa!{ar) [that is, he will be disinherited]." 
4. From a "brothership" adoption contract from Ugarit circa 14th 
century B.C.E. (N ougayrol, 1955, p. 75, lines 8-16 = Kilmer, 1974, p. 180) 
[names omitted]: "If the adoptee rejects (izer) [that is, wishes to termi-
nate the relationship of] his adopter as his brother, he will seize his ears 
and go free (uzne§u i~abbat u ipa!{ar) [he will be disinherited]. But if the 
adopter wants to reject (izer) the adoptee as his brother, he must pay 
I 000 silver shekels to the adoptee and his sons, and then he, the adoptee, 
may go free." 
Our examples show the usages of zeru in revocation clauses in Meso-
potamian contracts, and since siine:o is its precise Hebrew semantic 
equivalent, we believe that Siine:o likewise has the meaning 'to reject' in 
our context. 5 Jephthah complains to the elders that he had been unjustly 
disinherited by his brothers, and treating the court as if it itself had 
5. The verb siine° has this meaning in other contexts as well. A good example is Gen 
26:27 where Isaac protests to Abimelek: maddua0 bii0 tem 0eliiy we0attem fene 0tem 0i5ti 
watefalle}:zuni me 0ittekem, "Why have you come to me seeing that you both rejected and 
expelled me." In his 1978 dissertation on the verb siine°, Branson dealt fully with the legal 
aspects of this term in areas such as breach of contract in marriage, law courts, personal 
relationships, and international diplomacy. 
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brought the brief against Jephthah, he says halo" sene"tem "otf "did you 
not reject me?" That is, did you not reject my legitimacy (as an adopted 
son)? 
Jephthah next complains that the court had driven him out from his 
father's estate, wetegiirresunf "you drove me out." Obviously, this driving 
out was not a physical one (particularly since Jephthah was a gibbor 
flayil 'an able warrior'), rather a legal one.6 Jephthah was legally driven 
out from his father's estate. To ascertain the nature of this legal ex-
pulsion we compare the Akkadian semantic parallel of Hebrew gerres 'to 
drive out', which is fariidu. Although not as common as zeru, this verb is 
found in at least one extant Mesopotamian legal text involving adoption. 
The text is in the previously cited Old Babylonian Ana /ttishu material 
(III, iv 10-16 = Landsberger, 1937, p. 48): "If (the adoptee) has after-
wards revolted, run away, and fled, he is expelled (!ariidu) from his 
sonship (ana miirut!Su itru~u); he is removed from his heirship (ana 
ap/Ut!Su issub§u) 7 [that is, he will be disinherited]." 
Since fariidu in this context means 'disinheriting', and gerres is its 
exact semantic parallel, then Jephthah's complaint to the elders would 
be that they had disinherited him. Not only did they reject (siine") his 
legitimacy as an adopted son, but they also disinherited him (gerres). 
This is precisely what we were informed happened in the beginning of 
the passage: the sons disinherited Jephthah (wayegiirresu "et Yiptiib), 
and said that he would not share (lo" tinflal) in their father's estate. 
The third legal phrase which is found in our passage, and for which 
semantic parallels also occur in adoption contracts, is the phrase lehiisfb 
"et 'to restore', 'to return'. Jephthah uses this phrase in verse 9 as part of 
a condition without which he will not agree to go with the elders. This 
phrase is the semantic equivalent of Akkadian turru ana 'to return to', 
'to restore' which, in the context of adoption contracts, means to 
'reinstate'. 8 
An excellent example of the usage of the Akkadian phrase is seen in an 
adoption contract from Nuzi circa 15th century B.C.E. (Speiser, 1930, 
6. Jephthah was at least a generation older than the brothers. He would certainly have 
had friends and allies. If he was able to defeat the Ammonites he certainly would know 
how to "take care" of his brothers. Hence since Jephthah was a capable warrior the only 
way the brothers could get rid of him was through legal means not through force. See also 
our remarks in note 2 above. 
7. This latter phrase is the one most usually found in adoption contracts for expressing 
disinheriting. For examples, see Marcus (1981), 37-43. 
8. For other Hebrew examples of /ehiisib "et meaning "to restore, to reinstate," see Gen 
40: 13, 21 (to restore butler to office); 2 Sam 19: 12 (to reinstate David); Isa I :26 (restoring 
judges); and Jer 15:19 (reinstating Israel as God's people). 
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pp. 38-39), where a father who had previously disinherited a son now 
wishes to reinstate him. The phrase used for the reinstatement is ana 
miirutim utter lit. "to restore to sonship." The relevant sections of the 
text (lines 3-7) are as follows: "(as regards my son), I at first annulled 
his relationship, but now I have reinstated him as an adopted son (ana 
miirutimma uttersu). He is the elder son and a double share he shall 
receive." 
Since Hebrew lehiisfb :;et is the exact semantic equivalent of Akkadian 
turru ana, Jephthah, by making the condition :Jim me§fbfm :;attem :;otf, 
requests from the elders that he be reinstated in his father's house as a 
son. That is the condition for which he is willing to go and fight for 
Israel. And that is the condition to which the elders agree (verse 10). 
Jephthah's use of these three legal phrases, sane:;, gerres, and lehiisfb 
:;et, having to do with revocation, disinheriting, and restoration have 
important implications. Not only do we have here additional corrobora-
tion of the existence (usually doubted, see Donner, 1969, pp. 111-12, 
and Tigay, 1971, pp. 298-301) of adoption in ancient Israel, but we can 
assert quite confidently that Jephthah had originally been adopted by his 
father Gilead. 
But how do we deal with the fact that the text clearly states that 
Gilead fathered Jephthah (wayyoled GWiid :;et Yiptii/:z, verse l)? Does 
not the occurrence of the verbal form wayyoled 'he fathered' negate our 
thesis that Jephthah was adopted by Gilead? 
One solution is to translate wayyoled differently. Thus, Feigin (1931, 
p. 188), actually translated wayyO!ed not 'he fathered', but 'he adopted'. 
He pointed out that the Hiphil can have a declarative force as in the 
forms hirsiac, hi!fdfq, he:;esim and others, and has this force in wayyoled 
'and he declared Jephthah as a child', that is, 'he adopted Jephthah'. In 
this interpretation Gilead was not Jephthah's natural father, but he had 
adopted him prior to his wife having children herself. 
But it is more probable that wayyoled be interpreted in accordance 
with its normal usage elsewhere, i.e., 'to father', 'to engender', and that 
indeed Gilead was Jephthah's natural father. If so, why then would he 
have adopted Jephthah? The reason is clear. Considering the mother's 
profession as a prostitute, the certainty of Gilead's paternity could not 
have been assured. In fact, Gilead somewhat anticipated the later ob-
jection of his own sons. They argued that since Jephthah's mother was a 
prostitute he was not entitled to inherit because he may have been, by 
virtue of his mother's profession, not "son of another woman" but "son 
of another man"! To legally confirm his paternity of Jephthah, Gilead 
also adopted him. This type of adoption by a family member is usually 
termed legitimation. 
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The major difference between adoption and legitimation is whether 
the child is son of an outsider or not. If he is the son of an outsider, he is 
adopted; if he is already, in one form or another, within the family he is 
legitimated. For example, a man or a woman could make a grandson 
legally his or her own son (Jacob with Ephraim and Manasseh, Gen 
48:5; and Naomi with Obed, Ruth 4: l 6-17). Joseph legitimated his 
great-grandsons, the sons of Machir, Gen 50:23. Mordechai made his 
niece Esther his own daughter, Esth 2:7, and Gilead legitimated his own 
son Jephthah. 9 
If Jephthah was indeed legitimated by Gilead what was the basis for 
the brothers' suit against him? The brothers did not dispute the fact that 
Jephthah had been legitimated, but they argued that Jephthah, as the 
son of a prostitute, should not originally have been legitimated. In their 
opinion a prostitute's son could not be adopted or legitimated. Hence 
Jephthah's legal standing in the family should be reexamined and his 
adoptive status revoked. Obviously the elders agreed with the brothers 
because they ruled for them against Jephthah. 
This decision by the Gileadite elders does not seem to be one which 
would have been universally accepted in the ancient Near East. The 
evidence we have of at least one neo-Babylonian adoption text would 
seem to disagree with the Gileadite ruling. This text (San Nicolo, 1935, 
pp. 16-17 =Pritchard, 1969, p. 547), dating from the sixth century 
B.C.E., records the adoption of the son of a prostitute. The first part 
(lines l -16) of the text reads as follows: 
Innin-shumu-ibni, son of Nabu-ahhe-shullim, came to his sister Balta, 
daughter of Nabu-ahhe-shullim, and made the following declaration: "Give 
me Dannu-ahhe-ibni, your seventeen day old son. I will rear him, and he 
will be my son. Balta agreed, and gave him her seventeen day old son 
Dannu-ahhe-ibni for adoption. He was written down as the secondary 
heir (larlennu) to his son Labashi. As long as Balta is engaged in prostitu-
tion she will raise Dannu-ahhe-ibni. When Balta gets married (lnnin-
shumu-ibni) shall pay Balta the costs [itemized in the text] she expended 
for the feeding and rearing of Dannu-ahhe-ibni. 
This particular contract deals with the adoption of the infant son of a 
prostitute who will nevertheless look after the infant until such time as 
she gets legally married. In return the adopter will pay her expenses. The 
9. Parallels to these legitimation agreements are found elsewhere in the ancient Near 
East (see Mendelsohn, 1958, p. 182). For example, in a Ugaritic adoption contract 
(N ougayrol, 1955, pp. 70-71 ), dated in the 14th century B.C.E., a grandfather makes the 
son of his daughter his son and heir. 
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relationship of the adopted child to the adopter's natural son is spelled 
out: the adopted son is to be the secondary heir (tartennu). This is 
standard language for adoption contracts which nearly always makes 
provision for the adoptee vis a vis present or future natural children of 
the adopter (see Donner, 1969, pp. 90, 95, and examples in Pritchard, 
1969, pp. 219-20). 10 Were this provision to have been applied to Jeph-
thah's case then, after children were born to Gilead's wife, Jephthah 
should have had the standard rights of inheritance and should not have 
been dispossessed. Of course Jephthah's case was even stronger since he 
was also Gilead's natural son. At any event, it is this principle of the 
rights of adopted children that Jephthah claims the elders had violated, 
and which the latter, in the course of the negotiations, promise to 
rectify. 
To sum up, the disinheriting of Jephthah was not based solely on the 
fact that he was the son of a prostitute. Rather it followed from legal 
action of the brothers contesting Jephthah's adoption. Jephthah's adop-
tion, or more correctly his legitimation, had been legally revoked and 
annulled and, as a condition for leading the Israelite forces against the 
Ammonites, Jephthah insisted on being reinstated as a legitimate son, 
and having his legal rights to his father's estate restored to him. The 
elders conceded and Jephthah, having won his case on appeal, returned 
to fight for Israel. 
IO. The frequency in the ancient Near East with which hitherto childless adoptive 
parents had natural children themselves has been discussed by Kardiman (1958), pp. 123-26. 
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